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"I'D GLADLY PAY YOU TUESDAY FOR A [TAX
DEDUCTION] TODAY": DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS AND
THE DEFERRAL OF CHARITY
Samuel D. Brunson*

In recent years, donor-advised funds have become an
increasinglypopular vehicle for charitablegiving. In part,
their popularity can be traced to a disconnect in the law:
donor-advised funds look in many ways like private
foundations, but the tax law treats them as public charities.
This disconnect is advantageous to donors. Because Congress
was worried about wealthy individuals' ability to take
advantage of the control they can exercise over private
foundations, it imposed a series of additional tax rules on
private foundations. These rules, among other things, limit
the deductibility of donations to private foundations, require
that private foundations make
minimum
annual
distributions, and require a significant level of transparency
from private foundations.
The disconnect between donor-advisedfunds functioning
like private foundations but being classified as public
charities means that donors can use donor-advised funds to
circumvent the more onerous regulations governing private
foundations. Through a donor-advisedfund, a taxpayer can
take an immediate deduction for a charitabledonation with
no requirement that the fund distribute any of its assets. The
taxpayer enjoys a significant level of control over when and to
whom the donor-advised fund eventually distributes the
money. Further, the taxpayer enjoys complete privacy: as a
public charity, the donor-advised fund does not have to
disclose to the public what it does with its money.
Donor-advisedfunds qualify as public charities because
they are not individual entities. Rather, each fund is a
segregated account within a larger sponsoring organization.
This structure causes the donor base to be diverse, which, in
* Georgia Reithal Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago. Thank you
to Sarah Waldeck for suggesting the title and to the participants in the Maurer
School of Law Tax Policy Colloquium and the Loyola University Chicago School
of Law works-in-progress presentation for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts. I would also like to thank Loyola University Chicago School of Law for its
summer research stipend. Additional thanks to Jamie Brunson for her support.
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turn, is how these funds qualify as public charities. Donoradvised funds do not have to provide a way for donors to
circumvent the private foundations rules, though. This
Article proposes that donor-advised funds be required to
qualify as public charities individually rather than at the
sponsoring organization level. Doing so will ensure that the
rules meant to prevent charitableabuses will look at donoradvised funds' functions, not their forms.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The initial public offering of GoPro made founder and chief
executive officer Nicholas Woodman wealthy: after the company went
public, his net worth was about $3 billion. 1 In late 2014, Woodman
announced that he would give about $500 million of his stock to
charity. 2
This type of charitable pledge by a founder is relatively common. 3
It signals to the public that the company and its executives "take their
1. David Gelles, How Tech Billionaires Hack Their Taxes With a
Philanthropic Loophole, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/08/03/business/donor-advised-funds-tech-tax.html
[https://perma.cc/QCV3-SWZS].
2. Id.
3. See Natasha Frost & Alison Griswold, We Work's Co-FoundersMust Give
$1 Billion to Charity Over 10 Years or Lose Some Controlof the Company, QUARTZ
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philanthropic responsibility seriously." 4
Beyond philanthropy,
donating shares in a newly public company can provide significant
tax benefits to individuals. 5
In the first instance, the donor can take a charitable deduction
for the fair market value of the stock she donates. 6 In the initial
public offering context, there is an even more important consequence:
a charitable contribution is not a realization event and the donor does
not pay taxes on her gain on the appreciated property.7 In other
words, if Woodman had a basis of $1 million in the stock he donated
and he sold that stock in order to make a charitable gift, he would
realize $499 million of gain and would pay taxes on that amount. 8 By
donating the stock to charity instead, he not only received a
$500 million deduction but he also never had to pay taxes on the
stock's appreciation.
Historically, Woodman would have chosen one of two routes for
his philanthropy: he either would have donated the money to a public
charity or to a private foundation. 9 Woodman chose to go a third
route: he donated his stock to a donor-advised fund. 10
In recent years the popularity of donor-advised funds has
exploded, notably (though not exclusively) with Silicon Valley
billionaires. 1
The appeal of donor-advised funds is easy to
understand: they provide donors with the expedited deduction and
control of private foundations while simultaneously providing the
privacy and higher deduction limitations of public charities. 12
However, these advantages to donors may be disadvantageous to
the public at large, allowing donors to circumvent rules Congress
enacted to protect the public and charitable institutions. 13 Half a
decade after Woodman made his charitable contribution to the Silicon
Valley Community Foundation, the sponsoring organization of the
donor-advised fund Woodman set up, there is almost no trace of the

(Aug. 15, 2019), https://qz.com/1687628/adam-neumanns-control-of-wework-istied-to-his-charitable-pledge/ [https://perma.cc/D7S5-BWUS].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(a), (c)(1) (as amended in 2019).
7. Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset Appreciation Be Taxed?: The Case
for A Disposition Standard of Realization, 86 IND. L.J. 77, 106 (2011) ("Under
current law, a gratuitous transfer of appreciated property does not trigger a
taxable gain to the donor.").
8. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2018).
9. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
10. Gelles, supra note 1.
11. Id. ("That [donor-advised funds] have become so popular with Silicon
Valley billionaires has only added to their intrigue.").
12. See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
13. Gelles, supra note 1 (" [T]here is concern that [donor-advised funds] - a
dream vehicle for the overnight wealthy - may prove to be another instance of
techno-optimists disrupting a system with unintended consequences.").
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foundation or the $500 million he donated. 14 "The foundation has no
website and has not listed its areas of focus, and it is not known
what-if any-significant grants it has made to nonprofits." 15
This Article addresses the disconnect between donor-advised
funds' function as quasi-private foundations and their legal status as
public charities. Part II lays out both the history and the theory
underlying charitable deductions. Part III proceeds to look at the tax
rules that apply to private foundations and how they differ from the
rules that apply to public charities. This Part explains the reasons
why Congress decided it needed to impose more restrictive rules on
private foundations than it did on public charities.
Part IV introduces donor-advised funds. This Part explores their
development and how they function. Further, this Part discusses how
they managed to fit into the gaps between public charities and private
foundations and what they have in common with each category of
charitable institution. Part V then builds on that introduction,
explaining how donor-advised funds allow taxpayers to circumvent
the rules meant to cabin donations to nonoperating charities.
Part VI goes through a number of proposals intended to address
the problems of donor-advised funds. While these proposals have
addressed some of the problems, no proposal has comprehensively
dealt with blocking the slippage between donor-advised funds and
private foundations. As a result, Part VII proposes a solution: that
tax law treat donor-advised funds as separate entities. Doing so will
require each fund to qualify as a public charity on its own, not as part
of a larger group of funds. Looking at each fund as a separate entity
would align the policy goals of private foundations with the reality of
donor-advised funds. At the same time, it would not prevent a donoradvised fund from qualifying as a public charity; it would merely
require that fund to qualify for public charity status on its own.
II. THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION
The federal income tax exemption for charitable organizations is
as old as the modern income tax itself. Congress included this
charitable tax exemption in the abortive Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of
1894.16
The Supreme Court held the 1894 income tax to be

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Eric C. Chaffee, CollaborationTheory: A Theory of the Charitable TaxExempt Nonprofit Corporation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1719, 1735 (2016). While
the Civil War income tax did not include any kind of charitable exemption, it also
did not need to. With a small handful of exemptions-none of which qualified as
charitable-the Civil War income tax only taxed individuals, not entities. David
J. Herzig & Samuel D. Brunson, Let ProphetsBe (Non) Profits, 52 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1111, 1128 (2017) ("[T]he [Civil War] income tax treated corporations as
pass-through entities, and shareholders had to pay taxes on their pro rata share
of corporate income, whether or not the corporation paid out a dividend.").
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unconstitutional before it went into effect. 17 But in 1913, after a
constitutional amendment, Congress enacted a new federal income
tax. 18
The new income tax again included an exemption for
charities. 19
The charitable exemption makes up only one side of today's tax
treatment of tax-exempt charities, though. The other side is a
deduction for taxpayers who donate to charity. This deduction did not
enter the tax law until 1917,20 four years into the life of the income
tax and more than twenty years after Congress first exempted
charitable organizations from income taxation.
While the charitable deduction was not implemented until 1917,
Congress had previously considered the idea. The 1894 income tax,
for instance, included a corporate charitable deduction. 2 1 And in
1913, Representative John Rogers proposed that the income tax
include a charitable deduction for individuals. 22
Representative
Rogers situated his proposed charitable
deduction within other deductions the tax law used to ascertain net
income. 23 While he did not explicitly say that a taxpayer's net income
should not include amounts donated to charity, he strongly implied
as much. He went on to justify the exemption by arguing against any
"curtailment imposed by [the federal income tax] . . upon the
benevolent members of the community." 2 4 Ultimately, Rogers said if
a taxpayer wants to make a charitable gift, she should be encouraged
to do it, not penalized, and a deduction would provide just that
encouragement. 25 The House considered the Rogers amendment and
rejected it.26

Four years later, Senator Henry Hollis reintroduced the idea of a
charitable deduction using a remarkably similar justification: to
encourage the wealthy to make contributions to charitable
institutions. 27
This time, though, the charitable deduction
successfully made its way into the tax law. What happened between
1913 and 1917 that convinced Congress to change its mind?
World War I happened. When first enacted in 1913, the federal
income tax affected very few Americans, and even those affected paid
very little. Originally, the highest combined normal and surtax rate
17. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895).
18. Chaffee, supra note 16, at 1736.
19. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
20. Chaffee, supra note 16, at 1736.
21. Carol A. Jones, Note, TAX LAW Hernandez v. Comm'r: The Supreme
Court Forces A Square Peg into A Round Hole, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 917, 924
n.69 (1990).
22. 50 CONG. REC. 1259 (1913) (statement of Rep. Rogers).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 50 CONG. REC. 1259. The Congressional Record merely states that the
amendment was rejected, without any explanation of why.
27. 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis).
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was 7 percent, and the tax exempted a married couple's first $4000 of
income. 28 With the average adult man earning $578 per year, the tax
only reached about 2 percent of American households. 29
World War I required a drastic increase in federal revenue,
leading Congress to increase the top combined income and surtax rate
to 67 percent in 1917.30 Though tax rates had rocketed up, the income
tax had not transformed from a class to a mass tax 3 1-in 1918, only
about 15 percent of American families paid any federal income tax. 32
As Congress raised the tax rate, it worried about some collateral
consequences of increased taxation, including the consequences to
charities. Senator Hollis argued that people gave to charity out of
their surplus. After they have done everything else they wanted to
do-after they have educated their children and traveled and spent
their money on everything they really want or think they want-then,
if they have something left over, they would contribute it to a college
or to the Red Cross or for some scientific purposes.33
If taxes cut into that surplus, charitable giving would be the first
expense the wealthy would jettison. 34 But Senator Hollis believed
that a deduction for charitable giving would "permit a wealthy man
to contribute to charitable, educational, and scientific institutions,"
notwithstanding the high tax rate. 35
The 1917 law did not allow taxpayers an unlimited charitable
deduction. Senator Hollis proposed that the deductible amount not
exceed 20 percent of a taxpayer's net income. 36 Senator Furnifold
Simmons replied that he was amenable to a charitable deduction,
provided they lowered the ceiling to 15 percent. 37
When the bill passed, it provided for the deductibility of
"[c]ontributions or gifts actually made within the year to corporations
or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, or to societies for the

28.

STEVEN A. BANK ET AL., WAR AND TAXES 52 (2008).

29. Id.
30. Lawrence A. Zelenak, Leaving It Up to Treasury: Congressional
Abdication on Major Policy Issues in the Early Years of the Income Tax, 81 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 159 (2018).
31.

JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, THEIR FAIR SHARE: TAXING THE RICH IN THE AGE OF

FDR 231 (2013). That shift occurred with World War II, by the end of which more
than 90 percent of Americans filed tax returns. Id.
32. Id. at 5-6.
33. 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis).
34. Id.
35. Id. Interestingly, Senator Hollis seemed particularly concerned about
the viability of private universities. He estimated that the war conscripted half
of private universities' students, and without private donors, "it is going to be a
very serious problem whether [private universities] . . . can be kept open at all."
Id.
36. Id.
37. 55 CONG. REC. 6729 (1917) (statement of Sen. Simmons).
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prevention of cruelty to children or animals." 38 As Senator Simmons
requested, it limited the availability of the charitable deduction to
15 percent of an individual's "taxable net income." 39
The charitable deduction available to individuals has since
remained a part of the federal income tax, and the core of charitable
deductions has gone through only minor changes in the intervening
Subsequent legislation has expanded the types of
century. 40
organizations that qualify to receive deductible contributions. In
addition to corporations organized for the five purposes mentioned in
the War Revenue Act of 1917, today, donations to states, their
political subdivisions, and organizations that foster amateur sports
competition qualify as deductible. 4 1
Over time, Congress has raised the ceiling on deductibility while
also creating several different tiers of ceilings. Today, an individual
can deduct up to 60 percent of her "contribution base" (roughly her
adjusted gross income), 42 provided the donation is in cash and made
to a public charity. 43 Contributions of noncapital assets to public
charities face a ceiling of 50 percent, 44 while contributions of some

38. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330.
39. Id.
40. Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution
Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 849 (2001). "Minor changes" does not, of course,
mean "no changes." Plenty of exceptions, clarifications, and industry-specific
provisions have been added; recently, a student preparing for finals discovered
that some whaling captains can deduct up to $10,000 a year that they spend on
certain "subsistence bowhead whale hunting activities." See I.R.C. § 170(n)(1)(3) (2018). Notwithstanding these exceptions, clarifications, and virtually
inexplicable provisions, though, the general contours of the charitable deduction
roughly approximate those enacted in 1917.
41. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1), (2)(B). While the charitable deduction itself has
changed little, the context surrounding it has changed radically. In its initial
incarnation, there was no limitation on who could take a charitable deductionanybody who paid taxes could deduct qualifying charitable contributions. In
1944, Congress introduced the standard deduction to the tax law. Allan J.
Samansky, Nonstandard Thoughts About the StandardDeduction, 1991 UTAn L.
REv. 531, 532 (1991). The standard deduction technically did not affect the
deduction for charitable giving. Still, it reduced the likelihood that any given
taxpayer would deduct her charitable contributions. In 1944, the standard
deduction was 10 percent of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income if her adjusted
gross income was less than $5000, or $500 if it was $5000 or more. Individual
Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, § 9(a)(1), 58 Stat. 231, 236. A taxpayer could
elect to take the standard deduction but, if she did, it replaced most of her other
deductions, including the deduction for charitable contributions. Id. § 9(a)(2), 58
Stat. at 236-37. The year of its enactment, 82 percent of individuals who filed a
tax return elected the standard deduction and thus did not deduct their
charitable contributions, if any. Samansky, supra, at 532-33.
42. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(H).
43. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A), (G)(i).
44. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A). Under current law, the 60 percent deduction for cash
contributions made to public charities will drop back to 50 percent for taxable
years starting after December 31, 2025. Id. § 170(b)(1)(G)(i).
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capital gain assets-as well as donations made "for the use of' (rather
than "to") a public charity 45-face a 30 percent ceiling. 46
The complexity does not end there.
While the charitable
deduction regime has remained roughly the same throughout its
existence, the rules governing charitable donees have changed in
many ways. One significant change is that charitable donees have
been bifurcated into two types of organizations: public charities and
private foundations. 4 7 Private foundations share the same charitable
purposes as public charities but have different funding models.
Where public charities receive broad public support, private
foundations receive their support from a relatively small number of
donors. 48 A donor can only deduct donations to, or for the use of,
private foundations up to 30 percent of her contribution base 49 and
faces a 20 percent ceiling on her donations of capital gain property. 50
Just like the mechanics of the charitable deduction have seen
little change over the first century of the deduction's life, today's
justifications for the charitable deduction mirror Senator Hollis's
original statements. The principal justification for a charitable
deduction-to encourage charitable giving-"is to this day the major
rationale for a deduction." 5 1
Although the deduction-as-incentive justification is historically
rooted and feels both intuitive and compelling, it is not the only
explanation offered. A secondary justification is that an income tax
better meets the policy goal of horizontal equity when a taxpayer can
deduct her charitable donations. 52 According to this explanation, an
45. The Code defines a charitable contribution as "a contribution or gift to or
for the use of' qualifying donees. Id. § 170(c). The 50 and 60 percent deduction
limitations only apply to gifts made to a qualifying organization, though. Id. §
170(b)(1)(A), (G)(i). Thus, gifts made for the use of those organizations face the
lower ceiling. While the Code does not define what constitutes for the use of, the
Treasury regulations provide that a transfer of an income interest, whether in
trust or not, is for the use of a charitable organization, while the transfer of a
remainder interest is made to the organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-8(a)(2)
(1972).
46. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B)(i), (C).
47. See id. § 509(a).
48. Nina J. Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing
the Roles of FederalTax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy
by Private Foundations and Their Donors, 23 VA. TAX REv. 1, 62 (2003). For a
more detailed discussion of private foundations, see infra Part III.
49. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B).
50. Id. § 170(b)(1)(D)(i).
51. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a CharitableContributionsDeduction, 74
VA. L. REv. 1393, 1396 (1988); see also David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable
Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REv. 531, 552 (2006) ("In Congress, the courts, the media,
and now academia, the deduction is widely viewed not as a means to reify the
ideal tax base or reward praiseworthy donors, but as a tax expenditure used to
promote charitable giving and thereby the ultimate well-being of society.").
52. See C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and
Effective Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and
Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX PoL'Y 399, 404-05 (1995). Horizontal
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appropriate measurement of income would exclude charitable
donations for two reasons: charitable transfers do not represent
personal consumption, and charitable donors lose the ability to
control the use of the donated amounts and can no longer personally
benefit from them. 53
These two explanations are not necessarily inconsistent. In fact,
the measurement-of-income justification for the charitable deduction
may "enhance H the incentive argument for a deduction." 54 Under
either justification, though, the money must go toward something
society has deemed worthy because it replaces spending that would
otherwise fall to the government. 55 Merely giving up control over
money cannot, by itself, be enough, or we would allow taxpayers to
56
deduct gifts and other gratuitous transfers they make.
III. PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS

Individuals who donate to operating charities are not the only
taxpayers who can take a charitable deduction. Broadly speaking,
there are two categories of deduction-eligible charities: those
operating public charities and those operating private foundations. 57
The logic of allowing a charitable deduction to taxpayers is

equity holds that in a fair income tax, similarly situated taxpayers should pay
about the same amount in taxes. Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Utopia, 47 SETON
HALL L. REV. 137, 185 (2016).
53. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 52, at 405.
54. Id. Neither justification fits perfectly with the current income tax. In
2016, only 25 percent of tax returns claimed a charitable deduction. Mitchell
Franklin & Michaele L. Morrow, Taxpayers Just Want Tax-Deductible Fun;
Congress Ends the Party, 161 TAx NOTES 1341, 1342 (2018). In 2018, with the
standard deduction nearly doubled, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates
that only about 12 percent of taxpayers will itemize, meaning that at most, 12
percent of taxpayers will be able to deduct their charitable contributions. Erica
York & Alex Muresianu, The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Simplified the Tax Filing
Process for Millions of Households, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 965, 967 (2018). Those 88
percent of taxpayers who do not itemize will include the amount of their
charitable contributions in their taxable income, meaning that two individuals
who earn the same amount and do not itemize will pay the same amount in taxes,
even if one donates a quarter of her income to charitable organizations while the
other donates nothing. Moreover, in theory, those 88 percent of taxpayers do not
have a tax incentive to make charitable contributions because they get no tax
benefit from their contributions. But see Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits
of the CharitableDeduction: An Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV.
1307, 1309-10 (2012) (arguing that taxpayers overestimate the likelihood that
they will get the charitable deduction because they are acutely aware of the
deduction's existence but underaware of its limitations).
55. See Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 52, at 403-04.
56. While the recipient of a gift does not have to include the gift in her gross
income, I.R.C. § 102(a), the giver of a gift cannot deduct the gift if it is not made
to a qualifying tax-exempt organization, id. § 170(a)(1).
57. Tanya D. Marsh, A Dubious Distinction: Rethinking Tax Treatment of
PrivateFoundations and Public Charities, 22 VA. TAX REV. 137, 139 (2002).
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significantly more tenuous when it comes to private foundations
rather than to public charities.
While both public charities and private foundations must be
organized and operated for certain exempt purposes, 58 there are a
number of differences between the two. Perhaps the most salient
difference is that a private foundation is generally funded by a small
number of individuals, while a public charity receives the bulk of its
revenue from the general public. 59 Private foundations are generally
controlled by the person or persons who contribute to them.60 In
contrast to public charities, which engage in active charitable
endeavors, private foundations generally provide grants rather than
charitable services. 6 1
In the earliest decades of the federal income tax, the tax law
treated public charities and private foundations the same. 62 By 1950,
the government had become concerned about abusive foundation
behavior.6 3 The government saw wealthy individuals donating some
of their ownership of active businesses to foundations-while still
effectively controlling them-to avoid estate and gift taxes. 64 To
prevent these abuses, Congress imposed some limitations on taxexempt organizations in general but exempted public charities from
those requirements. 65 With that, the tax law began to treat public
charities differently from private foundations. 66
In 1964, Congress continued to rework the precise nature of these
tax rules as it dealt with its concerns. Congress was unhappy that
private foundations provided donors with an immediate deduction
while "frequently[,] contributions to foundations do not find their way
into operating philanthropic endeavors for extended periods of
time." 67 The subsequent year, a U.S. Department of the Treasury
report explained that about a quarter of private foundations had
distributed less than their net income for charitable purposes. 68

58. I.R.C. § 509(a) (2018).

59. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3(a)(1) (as amended in 2011) ("Section 509(a)(2)
excludes certain types of broadly, publicly supported organizations from private
foundation status.").
60. Garry W. Jenkins, Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International
Philanthropy,85 N.C. L. REV. 773, 788 n.47 (2007).
61. See id.
62. Marsh, supra note 57, at 148-49.
63. See Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundation Law: Historical
Perspective on Its Origins and Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 52, 53
(2000).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 53-54.
66. Marsh, supra note 57, at 149 ("The beginning of the private/public
distinction as a proxy for the pivotal variable, level of donor control, originated in
this 1950 legislation.").
67. S. REP. No. 88-830, at 60 (1964).
68. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEP'T REP. ON PRIVATE
FOUNDATIONS 26 (Comm. Print 1965).
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To ensure that private foundations distributed their income to
philanthropic organizations, the Treasury recommended that each
private foundation be required to distribute either its income or an
amount equivalent to a reasonable return on its assets (which the
Treasury estimated to be between 3 and 3.5 percent). 69 In 1969,
Congress adopted the Treasury's second suggestion but increased the
required distribution to 6 percent of the private foundation's net
assets. 70
In the ensuing fifty years, this specific rule for private
foundations has expanded into several rules that constrain private
foundations and their donors. The first is that donors have a lower
ceiling on deductible donations. Where donors to public charities can
deduct donations of up to 60 percent of their contribution base, 71
donors to private foundations face a much lower ceiling. On most
donations, donors to a private foundation can only deduct 30 percent
of their contribution base. 72 Further, donors to a private foundation
can only deduct amounts up to 20 percent of their contribution base
on any capital gain property they contribute. 73
Other limitations on private foundations are largely enforced by
a series of excise taxes. For example, Congress was concerned about
private foundations engaging in self-dealing transactions, 74 so it
imposed an excise tax on foundations of 10 percent on the amount
involved in self-dealing. 75 To prevent foundations from sheltering
active business income, they also face a 10 percent excise tax on any
excess business holdings. 76 In an attempt to discourage private
foundations from making excessively risky investments, they face a
10 percent excise tax on the amount of such investments. 77 Also, if a
private foundation makes a "taxable expenditure" (which is
69. Id. at 28-29.
70. Troyer, supra note 63, at 57.
71. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
72. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018).
73. Id. § 170(b)(1)(D)(i).
74. Troyer, supra note 63, at 57.
75. I.R.C. § 4941(a)(1). The tax law imposes an additional 5 percent excise
tax on foundation managers who are aware of the self-dealing. Id. § 4941(a)(2).
76. Technically, this excise tax on risky investments applies to investments
which "jeopardize the carrying out of any of [the private foundation's] exempt
purposes." Id. § 4943(a). An impermissible investment is one where the
foundation managers have exercised insufficient care in providing for the longterm and the short-term needs of the foundation. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i)
(as amended in 1973). To calculate whether a private foundation has excess
business holdings, it must add the stock it owns to the stock owned by its
disqualified persons.
If they collectively own more than 20 percent of a
corporation-or 35 percent if the corporation is controlled by an unrelated
person-the private foundation has taxable excess business holdings. I.R.C.
§ 4943(c)(2)(A)-(B).
77. I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1). As with the excise tax on self-dealing, this one also
comes with an excise tax on management, this time of an additional 10 percent.
Id. § 4944(a)(2).
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essentially any expenditure for a noncharitable purpose), 78 it owes an
excise tax of 20 percent of the amount of the expenditure. 7 9
The tax law still requires private foundations to make minimum
distributions, though the amount has fallen from 6 percent in 1969 to
5 percent today.8 0 As with the other rules, the minimum distribution
is enforced through an excise tax.
To the extent the private
foundation distributes less than the required 5 percent, it must pay a
30 percent excise tax on the underdistributed amount. 8 1
Finally, private foundations must pay a 1.39 percent tax on their
net investment income. 82 On its face, this tax does not intend to
encourage particular behavior; rather, Congress imposed it because
government benefits are available to everyone and "the costs should
be borne, at least to some extent, by all of those able to pay." 83
Congress also characterized this tax as a "user fee," paid because of
the "vigorous and extensive administration . . needed in order to
provide appropriate assurances that private foundations will
promptly and properly use their funds for charitable purposes." 84
Although this last tax is structured to raise revenue rather than
encourage or discourage particular behavior, it had a behavioral
component. Prior to December 2019, the default excise rate was
2 percent. If a private foundation distributed an amount equal to its
average distribution percentage from the prior five years plus 1
percent, and it did not owe an excise tax on an undistributed amount,
this tax fell from 2 percent to 1 percent. 85 In other words, until
Congress changed the law, a private foundation could reduce its
putative user fee by making sufficient distributions.
With all of the additional regulation and limitations on top of the
normal rules that apply to public charities, it is worth asking why
private foundations even exist. Why would someone want to organize
a private foundation, subject to the limitations and taxes they face,
when instead they could just directly make charitable grants?

78. See id. § 4945(d).
79. Id. § 4945(a)(1). Again, management may be subject to a 5 percent excise
tax in addition to the amount paid by the private foundation. Id. § 4945(a)(2).
80. Id. § 4942(d)-(e)(1).
81. Id. § 4942(a).
82. Id. § 4940(a).
83. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, pt. 1, at 19 (1969). Interestingly, though, there is
no equivalent tax on the net investment income of public charities, in spite of the
fact that they, too, enjoy the benefits of government and many could afford to pay
at least a portion of the costs. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from FederalIncome Taxation, 85 YALE
L.J. 299, 327 (1976).
84. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 19. It is worth noting that, although Congress
justified this tax as a way to fund administration related to private foundations,
it has not, in fact, been earmarked or used to pay for that administration. Trevor
Findley, Comment, Tax Treatment of Private CharitableFoundations:A Call to
Simplify the Excise Tax, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 477, 490 (2013).
85. See I.R.C. § 4940(a), (e)(1)-(4) (repealed 2019).
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One reason is for control.
"Individuals can retain nearly
unfettered control over the management and investment of assets
contributed to their foundations." 86
That control continues
throughout a donor's lifetime and may continue, at least to some
extent, even after she dies. 87 A private foundation also allows a
wealthy donor to inculcate charitable impulses in her descendants, as
her children and grandchildren join her in choosing how to disperse
charitable funds. 88 It also presents an opportunity for her to provide
jobs for her descendants (and, effectively, to transfer some amount of
wealth to them outside of the reaches of transfer taxes). 89
Along with control, a private foundation can insulate wealthy
individuals and families from the pressures of dealing directly with
requests of grant-seeking organizations. With one entity receiving
requests for grants and a board of directors determining whether to
fund those grants, the process of making donations is both more
objective and more removed from wealthy donors. 90
Private foundations also provide donors with tax benefits. As
discussed above, those benefits are more constrained than the
benefits of giving to public charities in some ways-donors face a
lower limitation on the amount they can deduct. 91 However, in some
cases, private foundations provide a tax benefit to donors: they permit
donors to accelerate their deductions. Of course, a donor to a private
foundation has to part with her money to get the benefit of the
deduction. 92 But she does not have to immediately determine what
charitable organization will ultimately benefit from that deduction.
Charitable contributions to the foundation are deductible for
income tax purposes in the year of the contribution, although
actual distributions from the foundation to other charitable
organizations may be deferred over time. Therefore, an upfront
income tax charitable deduction is available, notwithstanding
that the contributed funds are simply transferred to the donor's
private foundation, remain subject to the continuing control of
the donor, and may be used to make distributions over a long

&

86. Marsh, supra note 57, at 166.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Matthew F. Jones, Comment, The Other Family Tree: Leaving
Your Legacy in a PrivateFoundation, 63 ALB. L. REV. 567, 585-86 (1999) ("The
children of the rich grantor may be required to serve as trustees or in other
capacities in order to earn money from the private foundation in exchange for the
services they provide for it.").
90. Michelle Coleman-Johnson, Creatinga Family Foundation, 17 PROB.
PROP., Sept./Oct. 2003, at 10, 15.
91. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
92. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(a) (as amended in 2019) ("Any charitable
contribution . . actually paid during the taxable year is allowable as a deduction
in computing taxable income.").
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period of time well beyond the year in which the contribution is
first made to the foundation. 93
In fact, without the private foundation minimum distribution
requirement, donors could get a current deduction for money that
never goes to active charity, stymying the goals underlying the
charitable deduction.
IV. DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS

In many ways, donor-advised funds are the younger siblings of
private foundations. Donor-advised funds provide donors with a
similar ability to accelerate their charitable deductions while
exercising some degree of control over the eventual charitable use of
their funds. 94 Because of the administrative complexity of running a
private foundation, though, it only makes sense for certain relatively
wealthy individuals who intend to donate substantial amounts
through the foundation. 95
Although they are the younger siblings of private foundations,
donor-advised funds are beginning to supplant their older siblings.
"[D]onor-advised funds are widely replacing private foundations
because they are less expensive to organize and administer; require
fewer disclosures; provide more giving flexibility; and offer higher tax
deductions. The taxpayer receives a tax deduction in the year the
assets are transferred to the donor-advised fund." 96
These
advantages make donor-advised funds an attractive vehicle for
individuals who want current tax deductions but also want to delay
determining the ultimate recipient of their charitable largesse. 9 7
Donor-advised funds-"[o]ften referred to as the 'poor man's'
private foundation"-are public charities that, in many ways,
function like private foundations. 98 In essence, a donor to a donoradvised fund makes a charitable contribution to a tax-exempt

93. Richard L. Fox & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Plan Now to Avoid the Private
FoundationExcise Tax Rules, 29 TAx'N EXEMPTS, May/Jun. 2018, at 28, 30.
94. Roger Colinvaux, Donor Advised Funds: Charitable Spending Vehicles
for 21st Century Philanthropy, 92 WASH. L. REv. 39, 71 (2017) (noting that donoradvised funds provide "a current deduction but delayed decision").
95. Fox & Blattmachr, supra note 93, at 30-31.
96. Carrie Brandon Elliot, Taxation of Cross-BorderNonprofit Activity, TAx
NOTES INT'L, Nov. 26, 2018, at 867, 868.
97. Professor John Brooks contends that accelerating a charitable deduction
does not provide any substantive benefit to taxpayers because taxpayers could
instead purchase an investment asset, not pay taxes on its appreciation, and
donate it in the future to get a higher deduction. John R. Brooks, The Missing
Tax Benefit of Donor-Advised Funds, 150 TAx NOTES 1013, 1016 (2016). Under
certain conditions, that is certainly true. Still, at the very least, individuals
perceive an advantage to accelerating their deductions and can use donor-advised
funds to do so.
98. Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay,
11 FLA. TAx REV. 1, 32 (2011).
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sponsoring organization. 99 That sponsoring organization creates an
account in the donor's name and allocates each donor's donations into
the appropriate segregated account. 0 0 While donors no longer have
any ownership interest in their donations, they retain the right to
advise the sponsoring organization on how to distribute their
donations.101 Because donors have given up ownership of their
donations, the sponsoring organization has the legal right to ignore
their recommendations.10 2 Still, sponsoring organizations generally
distribute funds in accordance with donors' wishes 10 3-otherwise,
donors are likely to donate their money elsewhere.
Today's donor-advised funds can trace their roots to the 1930s,
when the New York Community Trust established the first such
fund. 104 For the first several decades of their existence, donor-advised
funds were generally sponsored by community foundations and were
relatively unknown.1 0 5
That changed with the birth of the
commercial sponsor.106 The first commercial sponsor, the Fidelity
Charitable Gift Fund ("Fidelity Charitable"), was launched in 1991,
and since then, a number of other commercial sponsors have
organized donor-advised funds. 107
Many of the commercial sponsors of donor-advised funds are
brokerage houses. 108 After donors donate money, but before they
request that the fund disperse that money to other charities, the
sponsors invest the funds in mutual funds that they manage.1 09 Just
like mutual funds have democratized diversified investments to some
extent,1 10 in theory, donor-advised funds provide a way for middleincome, if not poor, donors to reap similar advantages to those

99. Roger Colinvaux, Defending Place-Based Philanthropy by Defining the
Community Foundation, 2018 BYU L. REv. 1, 22 (2018).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Styles v. Friends of Fiji, No. 51642, 2011 WL 488951, at *1 (Nev.
Feb. 8, 2011) ("[T]he district court properly determined in accordance with the
agreement's express terms that Styles gave up any interest in the money when
he made the unrestricted gift to [Friends of Fiji], allowing [Friends of Fiji] the
discretion to reject any of his recommendations for the donation's use.").
103. Colinvaux, supra note 99, at 22.
104. John F. Coverdale, Legislatingin the Dark: How Congress Regulates TaxExempt Organizationsin Ignorance, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 809, 814 (2010).
105. Id.
106. Colinvaux, supra note 99, at 22.
107. Id. at 22-23.
108. Coverdale, supra note 104, at 814.
109. See id. at 813-14. Sponsoring donor-advised funds is one way these
sponsoring organizations can attract additional money into their mutual funds.
Id. at 814.
110. See Samuel D. Brunson, The Taxation of RICs: Replicating Portfolio
Investment or EliminatingDouble Taxation?, 20 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 222, 241
(2015) ("RICs were designed as a way for unsophisticated, low-to-middle-income
investors to get the benefits of diversification and professional portfolio
management.").
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foundations provide to the wealthy.11 1 Fidelity Charitable, a donoradvised fund that displaced the United Way as the top charitable
fundraiser in 2016,112 allows donors to open an account with a
minimum contribution of $5000 and has no minimum balance
requirement.113 However, in practice it appears that the average
donor to a donor-advised fund is relatively wealthy. James Andreoni,
an economist at UC San Diego, estimated, based on contributions to
and distributions from donor-advised fund accounts, that the average
donor to donor-advised funds had income between about $1.4 million
and $2.2 million. 114
While donor-advised funds look like private foundations in many
ways, there are certain salient differences-some advantageous to
Disadvantages include, for
donors and some disadvantageous.
instance, that a donor to a donor-advised fund gives up some level of
control in comparison to a private foundation. The donor to a private
foundation exercises actual control over the foundation, directing
both the timing and recipients of its charitable giving. 115 Donoradvised funds listen to donors' recommendations and are likely to
follow them, but donors to donor-advised funds still risk losing control
over their donations. 116 Likewise, because donor-advised funds are
professionally managed, wealthy donors cannot use them to employ
family members or otherwise transfer wealth to subsequent
generations. 117
Those disadvantages are, in many cases, outweighed by the
advantages of donor-advised funds. For instance, commercial donor-

111. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
112. Drew Lindsay et al., Fidelity CharitablePushes United Way Out of Top
Place in Ranking of the 400 U.S. Charities That Raise the Most, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/FidelityCharitable-Knocks/238167 [https://perma.cc/HM7Q-EB8R].
113. What It Costs, FIDELITY CHARITABLE, https://www.fidelitycharitable.org
/giving-account/what-it-costs. shtml
(last
visited
May
1,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/EDA9-T4HP].
114. James Andreoni, The Benefits and Costs of Donor Advised Funds 7 (Nat'l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
23872,
2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23872.pdf [https://perma.cc/K44K-8QPC].
115. See Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation'sGovernance
and Self-Interested FiduciariesCalls for FurtherRegulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093,
1195 (2001) ("[A]n attribute associated with private foundations is control by
donors and individuals loyal to them.").
116. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
117. Cf supra note 89 and accompanying text. While donors to donor-advised
funds cannot use these funds to employ or transfer assets to their descendants,
donors can use donor-advised funds to inculcate philanthropic values in their
descendants. When the donor to a donor-advised fund dies, she can name
succeeding advisors who will step into her shoes to make grant recommendations.
See, e.g., If I Establish a Donor-Advised Fund, What Happens After My Death?,
COMMUNITY FOUND. OF MONROE COUNTY, https://www.cfmonroe.org/faq/establishdonor-advised-fund-happens-death/
(last
visited
May
1,
2020)
[https ://perma.cc/9EVT-35E 5].
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advised funds have professional management 118 and, as such, do not
impose an administrative burden on donors the way that private
foundations do, and they generally cost less to operate. 119
Beyond the ability to minimize administrative burden and cost,
donor-advised funds present a significant tax advantage over private
foundations: for tax purposes, donations to donor-advised funds are
donations to public charities. 120 Why do the donations qualify as
donations to public charities? Because each donor-advised fund is
effectively a segregated fund in a sponsoring organization, and the
sponsoring organization qualifies as a public charity. 121
The
sponsoring organization, in turn, must be organized for a statutorily
exempt purpose and cannot be a private foundation. 122
A sponsoring organization should have no problem avoiding
private foundation status. It merely needs to ensure that more than
one-third of its support each year comes from people other than
"disqualified persons" 123 and that not more than one-third of its
income consists of unrelated business taxable income and investment
income. 124 For these purposes, a "disqualified person" is generally a
person who contributes the greater of $5000 or 2 percent of the
contributions received by a tax-exempt organization. 125 In 2012, the
seven largest sponsoring organizations managed over 100,000
individual funds. 126 Because the sponsoring organization, not the
individual fund, is the recipient of the charitable dollars, the
sponsoring organization is unlikely to have any individual who
provides more than one-third of its income, and thus should qualify
as a public charity.127
And in 2015, $4.6 billion of Fidelity

118.
119.

Colinvaux, supra note 94, at 66 n.113.
Raymond G. Russolillo, Planning Options for the Philanthropic Client,
85 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 204, 209 (2010).
120. Colinvaux, supra note 94, at 67 (noting that donor-advised funds
"indubitably are recognized as 501(c)(3) public charities").
121. David Wheeler Newman & Jacey L. Hayes, An Updated Guide to DonorAdvised Funds, 20 TAX'N EXEMPTS, Mar./Apr. 2009, at 28, 28 ("The donor
contributes property to a separate fund maintained by a public charity that is
referred to as the sponsoring organization.").
122. I.R.C. § 4966(d)(1)(B), (2) (2018).
123. Id. § 509(a)(2)(A).
124. Id. § 509(a)(2)(B). The sponsoring organizations of donor-advised funds
(such as Fidelity Charitable) technically qualify as "public foundations." Marsh,
supra note 57, at 142.
125. I.R.C. §§ 507(d)(2)(A), 509(a)(2), 4946(a)(1).
126. Paul Arnsberger, Donor-Advised Funds: An Overview Using IRS Data,
in THE RISE OF DONOR ADVISED FUNDS: SHOULD CONGRESS RESPOND? 61, 63 (2015),

https://lawdigitalcommons.bc. edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www. googl
e. com/&httpsredir=1 &article=10 17&context=philanthropy-forum
[https://perma.cc/U9XU-8AAR].
127. See Terry W. Knoepfle, The Pension ProtectionAct of 2006: A Misguided
Attack on Donor-Advised Funds and Supporting Organizations, 9 FLA. TAX REV.
221, 224 (2009) ("Supporting organizations are public charities that fulfill their
exempt purposes by supporting one or more other exempt organizations.").
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Charitable's $5.4 billion in revenue came from fresh contributions, 128
meaning less than one-third of its income would have been
disqualifying.
Because donor-advised funds are parts of public charities rather
than private foundations, they avoid many of the limitations that
private foundations face.
Donors, for example, get the higher
deductibility ceilings, and the donor-advised funds do not face the
minimum distribution requirements or the various excise taxes faced
by private foundations. 129 In fact, the tax law only imposes a single
regulatory limitation on donor-advised funds that it does not apply to
public charities in general. A donor-advised fund must pay a 20
percent tax on any taxable distribution it makes. 130 A taxable
distribution is any distribution a donor-advised fund makes to
individuals (or to any other person) if the purpose of the distribution
is a nonexempt purpose or if the donor-advised fund does not exercise
responsibility over its expenditure. 13 1
V. PROBLEMS WITH DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS

While donor-advised funds have existed in some form since the
1930s,132 Congress did not explicitly mention them in the tax law
until 2006.133 Although a significant percentage of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 dealt with tax-exempt organizations, creating the private
foundation regime, 134 it allowed donor-advised funds to slip through
the cracks. As a result, donor-advised funds have enjoyed the more
generous treatment available to public charities while acting in many
ways like private foundations. 135 For this reason, donor-advised

-

128. Felix Salmon, The Disrupter:How Fidelity and Its Donor-Advised Fund
Are Shaking up CharitableGiving for the Better, SLATE (May 11, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://slate.com/business/2018/05/fidelitys -donor-advised-fund-is-shaking-up
charitable-giving.html [https://perma.cc/F8CD-JDSW].
129. Marsh, supra note 57, at 169.
130. I.R.C. § 4966(a)(1). Fund managers owe an additional 5 percent tax on
taxable distributions. Id. § 4966(a)(2).
131. Id. § 4966(c)(1). Congress enacted this tax on certain distributions by
donor-advised funds in 2006. James A. Borrasso Jr., Opening the Floodgates:
Providing Liquidity to the CharitableMarketplace Through Changes to DonorAdvised Funds, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1533, 1540 (2018). In that legislation, which
first mentioned and defined donor-advised fund for tax purposes, Congress
intended to curtail potential abuses of donor-advised funds. Id.
132. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
133. Michael J. Hussey, Avoiding Misuse of Donor Advised Funds, 58 CLEv.
ST. L. REV. 59, 64 (2010) ("For the first time [in 2006], donor advised funds were
defined in the Internal Revenue Code.").
134. William H. Byrnes, IV, The Private Foundation's Topsy Turvy Road in
the American Political Process, 4 Hous. Bus. & TAx L.J. 496, 580 (2004)
("Approximately one-third of the 1969 Tax Reform Act dealt with tax exempt
organizations.").
135. The treatment of private foundation-like donor-advised funds as public
charities may not have been an accidental oversight by Congress. Norman
Sugarman, an expert on the tax law and former employee at the IRS, helped draft
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funds "have become an end run around the private foundation
rules." 136
Allowing donor-advised funds to act like private foundations
while giving them the benefits of public charities creates at least two
significant problems. First, it allows donors to accelerate their
charitable deduction while allowing their donated money to sit in the
fund-potentially indefinitely-without being used in actual
charitable endeavors. Second, it provides a means by which taxexempt organizations can qualify as public charities in spite of
lacking broad public support.
A.

Donor-Advised FundsMay Supplant Private Foundations

With their tax advantages and smaller administrative burdens,
donor-advised
funds
are
beginning
to
supplant
private
foundations. 137 Donor-advised funds provide almost all of the benefits
of private foundations without any of the limitations specific to
private foundations. 138 And, while most donors to donor-advised
funds appear to be wealthy, donor-advised funds, at least in theory,
democratize the world of accelerated charitable deductions and
delayed giving, providing an affordable and easy vehicle for the
middle class to employ.
Is this democratization good? Perhaps. Professor Daniel Hemel
argues that donor-advised funds do two important things. 139 First,
they allow donors to transfer appreciated assets to small,
unsophisticated charities. 140
Second, they "facilitate charitable
giving over the life cycle [of the donor]." 141 This facilitation, Professor
Hemel explains, allows individuals to claim charitable deductions in
their highest earning years and then to actually practice charity when
they are older and have more time but less income. 142
Both of these functions may be beneficial to society, at least if
donors to donor-advised funds are making contributions that they
portions of the 1969 Act on behalf of the Council of Jewish Federations and other
philanthropic organizations. Lila Corwin Berman, How Americans Give: The
Financializationof American Jewish Philanthropy, 122 AM. HIST. REV. 1459,
1476 (2017). Sugarman helped ensure that donor-advised funds could operate in
a way that "braided together public privileges and private interests, all while
operating in the legal lacunae of the 1969 tax law's classificatory apparatus." Id.
at 1477.
136. Lee A. Sheppard, Disciplining Donor-Advised Funds, 164 TAx NOTES
FED., Aug. 5, 2019, at 795, 799.
137. Elliot, supra note 96, at 868.
138. See id.
139. Daniel Hemel, Life, Death, and Donor Advised Funds, WHATEVER
SOURCE DERIVED (Aug. 15, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-sourcederived/life-death-and-donor-advised-funds-180c7644c833
[https ://perma.cc/9D6U-8L4T].
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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otherwise would not have made. 14 3 It is currently an open question,
though, whether donor-advised funds increase charitable giving or
whether they merely receive charitable dollars that would have
otherwise been donated to a private foundation or to a public
charity. 144 If they increase the charitable dollars available, they may
serve a valuable purpose. But if they do not increase charitable
dollars available, donor-advised funds may be harmful because they
cannibalize charitable giving that otherwise would have gone to
private foundations and public charities. This type of cannibalization
imposes social cost: "The longer that money sits unused in a [donoradvised fund], the longer that urgent needs of working charities and
those they serve go unmet." 145 In other words, with fewer current
donations, public charities are unable to provide the same societal
benefits they could provide if they receive donations directly.
The idea that deferring charity creates societal harm is not an
uncontested view. There is an academic discourse built around the
question of whether "current generations owe anything at all to future
generations." 146 There has been no universal conclusion, 147 but
people broadly seem to believe that "future generations should count,
and most likely count equally to those currently alive." 148 If we should
take future generations into account in our current decisionmaking-and especially if they count equally to current
generations-the idea of preferring current charitable distributions
may lose some of its power. That is especially the case if the private
foundation or donor-advised fund that holds charitable dollars
instead of distributing them earns a high enough return on those
assets.
Provided that the discount rate applied to the future
charitable donation is equal to the market rate of return a foundation
or donor-advised fund can earn on the money, society should be
indifferent as to whether charitable expenditures occur today or in
the future. 149
However, even if society arrives at the correct discount rate, there
are compelling arguments for why current charitable expenditures
are preferable to future charitable expenditures. Professor Brian
Galle argues that-discount rate and return notwithstanding143. See Colinvaux, supra note 94, at 51.
144. Id. ("Are [donor-advised funds] attracting money that would have been
contributed anyway, but to a private foundation or to another public charity? Or
are [donor-advised funds] attracting new charitable contributions that otherwise
would have been privately consumed?").
145. Roger Colinvaux, Fixing Philanthropy: A Vision for Charitable Giving
and Reform, 162 TAX NOTES 1007, 1011 (2019).
146. Neil H. Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future Generations?,77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1237, 1250 (2009).
147. Id.
148. David A. Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to Symposium on
IntergenerationalEquity and Discounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007).
149. See Dexter Samida & David A. Weisbach, ParetianIntergenerational
Discounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 145, 154-55 (2007).
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current charitable spending can have long-term benefits that may not
accrue with deferred spending. 150 He argues that future spending
may have diminishing marginal returns, because either (1) a
wealthier future generation will have more assets to solve problems,
or (2) as the charitable sector increases it will solve the more pressing
problems, so future charitable money will be relegated to solving less
important problems. 151 He also argues that spreading spending to
the future increases agency cost and decreases the information
available to donors and to the government. 152
Beyond these specific arguments about charitable giving,
Professor Neil Buchanan makes two tentative assertions about
intergenerational justice. First, because future generations are likely
to be richer than the current generation, the current generation
should worry less about saving for future generations and more about
caring for itself. 153 Second, even if the current generation acts
entirely selfishly, "we are still likely to adopt policies that end up
making future generations better off, notwithstanding whether or not
we care to do so." 154
While commentators make a convincing argument that, social
discount rate notwithstanding, current charitable spending is more
beneficial than future spending, the argument is not overwhelming.
It is tentative enough that it does not demand the complete
elimination of benefits for future giving. And, in fact, that seems to
be the conclusion Congress came to when it designed rules for private
foundations. It did not eliminate or delay charitable deductions to
private foundations. Instead, because private foundations delay the
active use of charitable money, they face significant regulation and
control in the form of excise taxes and limitations on the activities in
which they can participate. 155 Donor-advised funds manage to skirt
both providing current active charity and the regulatory framework
that Congress and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") have built
around private foundations.
Even if donor-advised funds increase charitable giving, merely
being beneficial to society is not a compelling reason for having
roughly the same level of oversight as public charities and receiving
the same deductibility of donations as donors to public charities.
After all, the justification for the deductibility of charitable

150. Brian Galle, Pay It Forward? Law and the Problem of RestrictedSpending Philanthropy, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1143, 1159 (2016). For example, he
says, spending on hospice care may not have significant future benefit itself, but
hospice care may lead to new methods of providing hospice care that will benefit
future generations. Id. at 1159-60.
151. Id. at 1160.
152. Id. at 1162-63.
153. Buchanan, supra note 146, at 1287.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
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contributions is primarily to encourage the donation of money that
the charity can use to pursue charitable purposes. 156
In fact, in the early twentieth century, charitable foundations
largely eschewed the development of endowments. In the 1910s, the
Federation for the Support of Jewish Philanthropic Societies of New
York City ("Federation") provided in its bylaws that it could not
accept legacies requiring it to hold the principal in trust and to limit
its charitable distributions to income from the corpus. 157 To the
extent it received a legacy, it had to distribute that legacy within
three years. 158 In the 1920s, Catholic Charities chose to follow the
Federation's lead, writing its bylaws to similarly prohibit it from
saving revenue in an endowment. 159 A century later, this distrust of
charitable endowments has largely, though not entirely, 160 melted
away.
Money donated to donor-advised funds cannot be used
immediately to pursue charitable purposes; those purposes must wait
until the donor-advised fund distributes money to a charity.
And donor-advised funds do distribute money to charity. In 2017,
the National Philanthropic Trust reported that donor-advised funds
made grants equal to 22.1 percent of their assets. 161 But this payout
rate is from overall funds, which masks differences between different
donor-advised funds. Some funds pay out all of their assets annually
while others hold assets indefinitely. 162 In general, the medianrather than the average-payout rate provides a better snapshot of
the percentage payout that donor-advised funds make because
outliers can significantly affect the average. 163

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See supra notes 28, 37-38 and accompanying text.
Berman, supra note 135, at 1467.

161.

NAT'L PHILANTHROPIC TR., 2018 DONOR-ADVISED FUND REPORT 18 (2018),

Id.
Id. at 1468.
See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.

https://www.nptrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018-DAF-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4PS-VK22]. The National Philanthropic Trust calculates the
payout amount based on the amount of assets held on the first day of the year.
Alan M. Cantor, A Closer Look at a Donor-Advised Fund's Questionable Payout
Numbers,
INSIDE
PHILANTHROPY
(July
20,
2015),
https://www. insidephilanthropy.com/home/2015/7/20/a-closer-look-at-a-donor[https://perma.cc/WQV4-T8N2].
advised-funds-questionable-payout-n.html
While this replicates the way private foundations calculate their payout rate, it
arguably overstates the payout rate of donor-advised funds, which get additional
donations over the course of the year. See id. And Fidelity Charitable began
using a five-year rolling average of its assets to calculate its payout rate. Given
that contributions to donor-advised funds are increasing almost exponentially,
using the rolling average will definitely inflate the reported payout rate. Id.
162. See infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
163. Pamela Foohey et al., Life in the Sweatbox, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 219,
235 n.91 (2018).
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In 2012, the median donor-advised fund paid out just over
7 percent of its assets. 164 More than one-quarter of the sponsoring
organizations reported payouts of less than 1 percent of their assets,
and almost 22 percent made no distributions. 165 And even these
numbers may overstate the amount of money that donor-advised
funds gave to charity because the distributions from sponsoring
organizations include not only money paid to public charities but also
money paid to other donor-advised funds. 166
Without the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") or the IRS
imposing any minimum payout requirement on donor-advised funds,
it is within each sponsoring organization's discretion how much, if
any, its minimum payout will be. 167
Commercial sponsoring
organizations have little incentive to encourage donors to recommend
distributions. Sponsoring organizations charge administrative and
investment management fees to the funds. 168 Commercial sponsors
of donor-advised funds also charge a fee based on the value of assets
under management. 169 The more money donors leave undistributed
in their donor-advised fund, the higher the fees a sponsoring
organization will earn.
At the same time, sponsoring organizations face at least some
pressure to make charitable distributions.
Fidelity Charitable
illustrates one way these conflicting incentives play out. Its policy
guidelines provide that, while it has historically made grants of about
20 percent of its assets annually, it must make minimum grants of
5 percent of its assets. 170 In addition, Fidelity Charitable requires
each donor to recommend grants at least once every four years. 17 1 If
a fund does not distribute any grants for four years, Fidelity
Charitable will make a grant to an approved charity from the fund in
question. 172 After five years, Fidelity Charitable will consider the
fund abandoned and will transfer all of its assets to an approved

164. Arnsberger, supra note 126, at 64. Arnsberger calculated a donoradvised fund's payout rate by dividing its grants for the year by the sum of its
grants for the year and its assets at the close of the year. Id.
165. Id.
166. Ray Madoff, Three Simple Steps to Protect Charities and American
Taxpayers from the Rise of Donor-Advised Funds, NONPROFIT Q. (July 25, 2018),
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2018/07/25/three-simple-steps-to-protectcharities-and-american-taxpayers-from-the-rise-of-donor-advised-funds/
[https://perma.cc/3RBY-4ZF7].
167. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
168. Mary C. Hester, Donor-Advised Funds: When Are They the Best Choice
for CharitablyMinded Clients?, 108 J. TAx'N 330, 344 (2008).
169. Id.
170. FID. CHARITABLE, FIDELITY CHARITABLE POLICY GUIDELINES: PROGRAM
CIRCULAR 19 (2018), https://www.fidelitycharitable.org/docs/Giving-AccountPolicy-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG75-CNGP].
171. Id.
172. Id.
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charity. 173 But while Fidelity Charitable requires donors to advise
grantmaking on a regular basis, it has no guidelines for how large the
grant must be. 174 So, while Fidelity Charitable requires donors to
donor-advised funds to recommend regular distributions, it also
allows donors to keep virtually all of their donated money in the
funds.
B.

Donor-Advised Funds and the Erosion of Public Support

Donor-advised funds effectively undermine the traditional
division between public charities and private foundations. They do
this by allowing donors to accelerate their charitable deductions
without facing the deductibility limitations and excise taxes of private
foundations.
But donor-advised funds also break down the
differences between public charities and private foundations in
another way: donors can also use donor-advised funds to skirt the
public support requirements for public charities.
Certain exempt organizations always qualify as public charities.
The Code lists a number of tax-exempt organizations that
automatically qualify as public charities, not private foundations. 175
These statutory public charities include, among other things,
churches, educational institutions (provided they have faculty,
students, and a location), organizations that provide medical care or
education (if the organization is a hospital or is associated with a
hospital), and organizations that receive a substantial portion of their
support from the government and the general public. 176
Other unenumerated tax-exempt organizations can also qualify
as public charities. To qualify, a tax-exempt organization must
receive more than one-third of its support from donors who are not
disqualified persons, from certain governmental units, and from taxexempt organizations that automatically qualify as public
charities. 177
"Disqualified persons" include managers of, and
substantial contributors to, the exempt organization. 178 A donor
becomes a substantial contributor if her donations exceed $5000 in a

173. Id.
174. Or, at least, it has very few guidelines. A grant must be at least $50 or
the balance of the account and above $50; Fidelity Charitable requires that
grants be made in $5 or $18 increments. Id. The $18 increments, Fidelity
Charitable explains, are because that "number has cultural significance for some
donors." Id. In fact, in the Jewish community in the United States, charitable
donations are commonly made in multiples of $18 because the number eighteen
represents "living or 'life,' a notion reinforced by the traditional concept that
charity wards off death." SOL STEINMETZ, DICTIONARY OF JEWISH USAGE: A GUIDE
TO THE USE OF JEWISH TERMS 25 (2005).

175. I.R.C. §§170(b)(1)(A), 509(a)(1) (2018).
176. Id. §§ 170(b)(1)(A), 509(a)(1).
177. Id. § 509(a)(2).
178. Id. §4946(a)(1)(A)-(B).
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taxable year and represent more than 2 percent of the total donations
the organization receives during the year. 179
In calculating whether a tax-exempt organization meets the onethird public support requirement for public charities, the tax-exempt
organization includes all of its grants in the denominator, but it must
exclude donations from disqualified persons from the numerator. 180
Donations from disqualified persons thus reduce the chances that a
tax-exempt organization will meet the public support requirement,
making it harder for an organization to achieve public charity status.
The sponsor of a donor-advised fund qualifies as an enumerated
public charity, a result of it receiving a substantial portion of its
support from the general public. 181 As a public charity, donations
from a donor-advised fund will not be treated as donations from a
disqualified person and will not face the 2 percent limitation. 182 The
Treasury regulations recognize that disqualified persons could try to
launder their donations through public charities and recharacterize
indirect contributions as being contributions directly from the
disqualified person. 183 An indirect contribution is one "which is
expressly or impliedly earmarked by the donor as being for . . . a
particular recipient." 184 In the case of a donor-advised fund, the
contribution would probably not qualify as expressly or impliedly
earmarked. The donor gives the money and advises the sponsor to
give it to a particular recipient but has no legal ability to require that
the sponsor follow her advice. 185
The IRS has recognized the potential of this type of evasion. To
avoid abuse of this kind, it is currently considering "treating, solely
for purposes of determining whether the distributee charity qualifies
as publicly supported, a distribution from a [donor-advised fund] as
an indirect contribution from the donor (or donors) that funded the
[donor-advised fund] rather than as a contribution from the
sponsoring organization." 186
Until it does so, however, board
members and substantial donors have the ability to, for only a
marginal additional cost, give through a donor-advised fund rather

179. Id. §§ 507(d)(2)(A), 4946(a)(2).
180. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3()(1) (as amended in 2011) ("[I]f . . the donor is
a substantial contributor . . . with respect to the ultimate recipient, such amount
shall be excluded from the numerator of the support fraction under section
509(a)(2).").
181. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi); see also I.R.S. Notice 2017-73, 2017-51 I.R.B.
562, 566 ("Because of the contributions they receive from the general public, DAF
sponsoring organizations typically qualify as § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) organizations
whose distributions from DAFs would ordinarily be counted as public support
without limitation to the distributee charity.").
182. See I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3()(1).
183. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3()(1).
184. Id. § 1.509(a)-3()(2).
185. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
186. I.R.S. Notice 2017-73, supra note 181, at 566.
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than directly without compromising a tax-exempt organization's
ability to qualify as a public charity.
Why did Congress decide that a public charity needed to derive
one-third of its income from the general public? When Congress
created the split between public charities and private foundations, it
explained that it designed the one-third public support requirement
"to insure that the organization is responsive to the general public." 187
It makes sense that Congress would want public charities to be
accountable to the general public. 188 After all, allowing donors to
deduct up to 60 percent of their adjusted gross income represents both
a significant subsidy of the charity's mission 189 and a significant
amount of foregone federal revenue. 190
Congress imposed a level of accountability on private foundations
through the series of excise taxes they have to pay if they act in
undesirable ways.191 Public charities face far fewer explicit legal
constraints. Congress believed that "dependence on public support
and accompanying public scrutiny would prevent" public charities
from abusing their charitable funds. 192
Allowing contributions from a donor-advised fund to qualify as
public contributions risks short circuiting this quasi-regulatory

187.

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST

CONG.,

GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 58 (Comm. Print 1970).

188. See Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the
InternalRevenue Code's Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1269,
1303 n.94 (1993).
189. Herzig & Brunson, supra note 16, at 1114 ("[T]here is little debate that
the deduction for charitable donations is a subsidy.").
190. In 2018, the Treasury Department estimated that the charitable
deduction represented a tax expenditure (that is, foregone revenue) for that year
of over $56 billion.

OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX

EXPENDITURES 24-25 (2018), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/TaxExpenditures-FY2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RWK-6QQ2]. While the Treasury
tax expenditure budget does not differentiate charitable deductions for donations
to public charities from charitable deductions for donations going to private
foundations, it is possible to get a rough idea of the cost of donations to private
foundations. In 2015, private foundations received donations worth about $61
billion.

STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., IRS, DOMESTIC PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS:

NUMBER AND SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA, BY TYPE OF FOUNDATION AND SIZE OF FAIR

MARKET VALUE OF TOTAL ASSETS, TAX YEAR 2015 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub

/irs-soi/15pf0lta.xls [https://perma.cc/7HEX-2RS5]. Assuming those donations
were fully deductible, and that the donors were in the top tax bracket, donations
to private foundations in 2015 reduced government revenue by about $24 billion.
191. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
192. Alyssa A. DiRusso, Supporting the Supporting Organization: The
Potentialand Exploitation of 509(A)(3) Charities, 39 IND. L. REV. 207, 211 (2006).
While this was Congress's theory, it is not a foregone conclusion. Shortly after
Congress enacted the public support rule, one legal commentator asked how
realistic it was to "assume that publicly-supported organizations are in general
performing their obligations with more propriety and skill than foundations[.]"
Richard D. Kahn, Regulation of Privately Supported Foundations: Some
Anomalies, 4 IND. LEGAL F. 271, 280-81 (1970).
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regime. A tax-exempt organization would not have to raise one-third
of its support from the general public. Rather, it could receive mostif not all-of its support from a single individual, provided that the
individual made her donations through a donor-advised fund. Unless
the IRS follows its recognition of this potential problem with action,
donor-advised funds could allow public charities to operate without
the explicit constraints imposed on private foundations and without
the public accountability that comes from soliciting donations from
the general public.
C.
Using Donor-Advised Funds to Meet the Distribution
Requirement
The tax law requires private foundations to make a minimum
annual distribution. 193 Under current law, that minimum annual
distribution is 5 percent of the fair market value of its assets, with
certain minor adjustments. 194 If a private foundation distributes less
than the required amount, it has to pay an excise tax equal to 30
percent of its under-distribution. 195
The tax law allows a broad range of distributions to qualify as
part of the minimum annual distribution. In general, any amount
that the private foundation distributes to accomplish one or more
charitable purposes-including many administrative expensescounts toward the 5 percent minimum distribution. 196 The law carves
out exceptions from qualifying distributions, including any
distribution to another private foundation and any distribution to an
organization controlled by the private foundation or by disqualified
persons of the distributing private foundation. 197
The carve outs make sense. The purpose behind the private
foundation distribution requirement was to ensure that deductible
charitable money found its way into active philanthropic
endeavors. 198 Because the private foundation rules allowed for an
immediate deduction even though private foundations do not directly
provide charitable services, the excise tax discourages private
foundations from keeping their funds out of active charities
indefinitely.
A private foundation can get around this distribution
requirement and avoid the excise tax by making donations to donoradvised funds that qualify as part of the minimum annual
distribution. 199 Donor-advised funds qualify as public charities, 20 0 so

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 4942(d), (e)(1) (2018).
Id. § 4942(a).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 2015).
Id. § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2)(i)(a)-(b).
See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
See Colinvaux, supra note 145, at 1011.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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distributions to donor-advised funds are not disqualified under the
first exception. Further, for the private foundation or its disqualified
persons to "control" the donor-advised fund, they would have to have
the authority to "require the donee organization to make an
expenditure, or prevent the donee organization from making an
expenditure." 20 1 While donors to donor-advised funds can recommend
investments and charitable distributions, they lack the legal
authority to require the donor-advised fund to make a distribution. 20 2
As a result, "[f]oundation-to-[donor-advised fund] grants are yet
another way that money can remain under effective control of the
donor without getting to working charities."2 0 3 Again, the unique
structure of a donor-advised fund-which looks in many ways like a
private foundation but is treated as a public charity-provides a way
for donors to accelerate their charitable deduction while effectively
keeping the money away from functioning charities.
VI. FIXING THE PROBLEMS

The problems with the tax treatment of donor-advised fundsespecially the risk that they will not make distributions-are well
understood by policymakers and commenters.
They broadly
recognize that the status quo is not optimal for many of the reasons
discussed above. As a result, these policymakers and commenters
have made a number of proposals intended to either encourage donoradvised funds to make distributions or to better align charitable
deductions and the actual charitable use of their donations. However,
these proposed changes would have concomitant problems that make
them less desirable.
This Part will discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of some of the proposals, and Part VII will then propose
an alternative regime that would deal with the current problems
inherent to donor-advised funds.
A.

Pension ProtectionAct of 2006

Historically, tax law has largely ignored donor-advised funds,
allowing them to function without specific legislation or regulation
aimed at them. 20 4 President Clinton proposed legislation, but
Congress did not act on his recommendation. 20 5 Then, in the mid2000s, the IRS listed donor-advised funds in its "dirty dozen tax
scams" but "offered no specific information justifying including donoradvised funds in the list." 206
201. Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(3).
202. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
203. Colinvaux, supra note 145, at 1011.
204. Coverdale, supra note 104, at 821 ("Despite the potential for abuse of
donor-advised funds, for many years neither the government nor the public
showed any interest in regulating them.").
205. Id. at 823.
206. Id.
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Still, in 2006, Congress worked to rein in perceived abuses of
donor-advised funds. 20 7 As part of the Pension Protection Act of
2006,208 it created "penalty excise taxes that apply only to donoradvised funds and supporting organizations, and not to other public
charitable organizations." 20 9
These penalty excise taxes discouraged two potential abuses by
donors to, or sponsors of, donor-advised funds. The first is an excise
tax on "taxable distributions." 2 10 Taxable distributions include any
distributions to individuals or to nonexempt organizations. 211 If a
donor-advised fund makes a taxable distribution, the sponsoring
organization owes an excise tax of 20 percent of the taxable
distribution. 2 12 In addition, if any fund manager agrees to the
distribution (while knowing that it is a taxable distribution), the fund
manager owes an excise tax of 5 percent. 2 13
The second excise tax Congress created for donor-advised funds
is a tax on prohibited benefits. 2 14 This excise tax applies when a
donor-advised fund makes a distribution that benefits the donor-or
certain other people related to the donor or the fund-directly or
indirectly. 2 15 If it makes such a distribution, the person who advised
the fund to make the distribution, or the person who received the
benefit of the distribution, owes an excise tax of 125 percent of the
benefit received. 216 In addition, as with the first excise tax, a
manager who approves the distribution knowing that it would confer
a prohibited benefit must pay an excise tax of 10 percent of the
benefit. 217
It is not clear that these targeted excise taxes were entirely
necessary. Because donor-advised funds occupied a niche somewhere
between traditional public charities and traditional private
foundations, they were subject to the potential abuses of both, but
without the regulation that reined in such abuses. 2 18 Still, the IRS
had general tools to prevent the worst abuses by donor-advised

207. Id. at 827 ("The Pension Protection Act of 2006 created for the first time
a statutory category for donor-advised funds and applied to them a set of
provisions intended to prevent abuses.").
208. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, 1094-102 (2006) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
209. Knoepfle, supra note 127, at 223.
210. I.R.C. § 4966 (2018).
211. Id. § 4966(c)(1).
212. Id. § 4966(a)(1).
213. Id. § 4966(a)(2).
214. Id. § 4967.
215. Id. § 4967(a)(1).
216. Id.
217. Id. § 4967(a)(2).
218. See Coverdale, supra note 104, at 821.
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funds, 219 and there was no reason to believe that taxpayers were
systemically abusing donor-advised funds. 220
Whatever the benefits of these excise taxes were, they do not
address the use of donor-advised funds either to accelerate charitable
deductions or to avoid private foundation status. As a result, the sole
piece of federal legislation addressing donor-advised funds does
nothing to ensure that charitable dollars get to charities in a timely
manner. 221

B.

Tax Reform Act of 2014

Shortly before stepping down as the Chair of the House Ways and
Means Committee, Representative Dave Camp introduced the Tax
Reform Act of 2014.222 Proposed as a baseline for future tax reform,
the centerpiece of the Camp proposal involved simplifying the tax law,
broadening the tax base, and lowering tax rates. 223 But the 979-page
bill did more than merely eliminate deductions and lower rates. 2 24
Among other things, it addressed the problem of donor-advised funds
holding onto their money rather than distributing that money to
functioning charities. 22 5
The Camp proposal required donor-advised funds to distribute all
of their contributions to eligible recipients within five years of
receipt. 226 To the extent that any contributions remained in the
219. See Knoepfle, supra note 127, at 223 ("In fact, the IRS already had every
tool it needed to monitor, regulate, and sanction donor-advised funds and
supporting organizations.").
220. See Coverdale, supra note 104, at 811 ("Congress paid no attention to
[donor-advised funds] until articles appeared in the press alleging abuses at a
small number of donor-advised funds.").
221. Recently, there has been some state interest in regulating donor-advised
funds, too. On February 22, 2019, California Assembly Member Buffy Wicks
introduced AB 1712. Assembly Member Wicks was concerned both about the lack
of transparency, oversight, and accountability of donor-advised funds and donoradvised funds failing to provide the benefits that donations to public charities
provide. Assemb. B. 1712, 2019-20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as reported by Cal.
Leg., Feb. 22, 2019). Because the Assembly did not pass the proposed bill by
January 31, 2020, the Assembly lost the ability to act upon the bill under
California's constitution. Id. For now, then, the bill is dead.
222. Jason S. Oh, Will Tax Reform Be Stable?, 165 U. PA. L. REv. 1159, 1185
(2017).
223. See Martin A. Sullivan, All Roads Lead to VAT, Commentary on: The
Saga of Unfulfilled Business Income Tax Reform by Harry L. Gutman, 89 TEMP.
L. REv. 341, 347 (2017) ("Though his plan eliminated and downsized dozens of
tax breaks, he was only able to reduce the top individual rate to 35% and the
corporate rate to 25%.").
224. Id.
225. See Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. § 5203 (2014).
226. Id. Three years prior to Camp's bill, Professor Ray Madoff suggested a
similar solution to the problem of donor-advised funds not making sufficient
distributions. Under Professor Madoffs proposal, donor-advised funds would
have to distribute donations they received within seven years of receipt. Ray D.
Madoff, It's Time to Reform Donor-Advised Funds, 133 TAx NOTES 1265, 1270
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donor-advised fund after five years, the sponsoring organization
would have to pay an annual 20 percent tax on the undistributed
amount. 227 Camp's proposal for donor-advised funds reflected the
early twentieth century discomfort with endowment building. 228
The Camp proposal would likely be effective at incentivizing
donor-advised funds to make substantial distributions of their assets
to public charities. The cost of holding assets for more than five
years-the 20 percent excise tax-almost certainly exceeds the return
the sponsoring organization could earn holding those assets

instead.

229

The Camp proposal suffers from at least two significant
problems. First, while it remedies the issue of donor-advised funds
failing to distribute their assets to public charities, it does nothing to
solve the problem of donors using donor-advised funds to circumvent
the public support requirement. 230 Because donor-advised funds
would continue to qualify as public charities, their donations would
continue to count as public support in determining whether a taxexempt organization qualifies as a public charity. 231
Second, the proposal adds unnecessary complexity to the Code.
The tax law already classifies charities into a public charity basket
and a private foundation basket and provides a different set of rules
for each. 232 The Camp proposal introduces a brand new regime for
donor-advised funds, different from that governing both public
charities and private foundations, adding to the complexity of the tax
law. 233 Public charities have no distribution requirement, while
private foundations must distribute 5 percent of their assets
annually. 234 The Camp proposal would introduce a third regime, one
requiring the distribution of all assets within five years, to the
235
already extant regimes.

(2011). Professor Roger Colinvaux also recently embraced this mandatory
distribution idea, recommending that the law require donor-advised funds to
distribute their assets within five to seven years after receiving them. Colinvaux,
supra note 145, at 1011.
227. H.R. 1 § 5203. Because the donor would presumably make periodic
donations, the law would treat distributions on a first-in, first-out basis. Id.
228. Berman, supra note 135, at 1467-68.
229. Between 1926 and 2001, the median rate of return was 10.5 percent.
Howell E. Jackson, To What Extent Should Individual Investors Rely on the
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: A PreliminaryInvestigation of Dispersion in
Investor Returns, 28 J. CORP. L. 671, 674 (2003).
230. See infra Subpart V.B.
231. The Camp proposal did ensure that donor-advised funds could not just
pass their assets on to other donor-advised funds. The bill carved donor-advised
funds out of the list of organizations that could receive qualifying distributions.
H.R. 1 § 5203 (excluding "any fund or account described in section 4966(d)(2)").
232. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
233. See H.R. 1 § 5203.
234. I.R.C. § 4942(d), (e)(1) (2018).
235. H.R. 1 § 5203.
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In general, sound tax policy seeks to avoid complexity where
possible. 2 36
While complexity may be justified in certain
circumstances, having fewer regimes is generally better than having
more. 237 A requirement that donor-advised funds distribute all of
their receipts within five years may discourage donors from giving to
donor-advised funds, shifting their deferred donations instead into
private foundations-or perhaps even discouraging them from giving
at all. Donor-advised funds clearly differ from private foundations
and public charities. It is not clear, however, that these differences
are so profound that the benefits of having a distribution requirement
that only applies to donor-advised funds outweighs the costs.
Ultimately, while the Camp proposal would effectively encourage
donor-advised funds to make distributions of their assets to public
charities, it does not appear to be an optimal solution to the problems
presented by donor-advised funds. It does not address the public
support problem and, while it solves the problem of nondistribution,
it does so in a manner that adds unnecessary complexity to the tax
law and to donors' decisions of how to give.
C.

Delay the Deduction

Professor Roger Colinvaux proposes an elegant solution to the
problem of donor-advised funds holding assets rather than
distributing them to public charities. Professor Colinvaux would
delay a donor's tax deduction until the donor-advised fund distributed
the donation to an eligible recipient. 2 38 He argues that "[d]elaying
the charitable deduction until the [donor-advised fund's] distribution
would likely be as effective as a payout, if not more so, at speeding up
distributions." 239 To the extent that a donor's willingness to make
charitable contributions is influenced by her desire to get a deduction,
aligning the year of the deduction with the year of the distribution
will provide her with an incentive to recommend distributions sooner
rather than later.
Professor Colinvaux acknowledges that his proposal would likely
"have the effect of ending the main appeal of' donor-advised funds:
the accelerated deduction. 240 He is fine with that result, at least as

236. In 1998, Congress required the IRS to provide a report to Congress that
included sources of complexity in the Code and recommendations for how to
reduce that complexity. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 4022(a), 112 Stat. 685, 785.
237. Cf. David J. Herzig & Samuel D. Brunson, Tax Exemption, Public Policy,
and DiscriminatoryFraternities, 35 VA. TAX REV. 116, 143 (2015) ("[I]mporting
the standard from section 501(c)(3) would reduce complexity. . . . That single
standard would also provide nonprofit clubs with a larger body of precedent that
such nonprofit clubs could look to in understanding what behaviors the tax law
proscribed, if they wanted to maintain their exemption.").
238. Colinvaux, supra note 94, at 70.
239. Id. at 71.
240. Id.
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long as giving to donor-advised funds merely substitutes for other
forms of charitable giving.241
In spite of its elegance, the downsides to this proposal are similar
to those of the Camp proposal. Like the Camp proposal, it does
nothing to address the use of donor-advised funds to evade the public
support requirement. Even with the date of the deduction deferred
until the date of distribution, donors could use donor-advised funds to
transform their support of a tax-exempt organization into public
support.
Much like the Camp proposal, this proposal creates a third
regime, adding to the complexity of the tax law. In addition to legal
complexity, the proposal would add some amount of administrative
complexity, requiring the sponsoring organization to notify donors
when it made distributions from their funds, a requirement that
would not apply to similarly situated private foundations. 242
VII. CHARACTERIZING DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS AT THE SEGREGATED
ACCOUNT LEVEL

The problems of donor-advised funds arise from the fact that they
largely function as miniature private foundations, but the tax law
treats them as public charities. This mismatch underlies both donors'
ability to take a charitable deduction-potentially significantly in
advance of their donation's use for charitable purposes-and donors'
ability to use donor-advised funds to circumvent the public support
requirement.
Being treated as public charities allows donor-advised funds to
escape much of the regulation and excise taxation that ensures that
private foundations do not abuse their tax exemption and further
allows donors to enjoy the higher deduction limitations. An easyand effective-way to solve all of these problems would be to treat
donor-advised funds like private foundations for tax purposes.
Before detailing how and why, it is worth acknowledging that
donor-advised funds are not just miniature private foundations.

241. See id. at 71 ("[T]his is not necessarily a bad result, except to the extent
that [donor-advised fund] contributions represent new giving.").
242. Id. at 70. While charitable deductions are meant to encourage donors to
give money to organizations that engage in active charity, it is not completely
clear that the tax law should disallow charitable deductions until the money gets
into the hands of an active charity. While that question is beyond the scope of
this Article, Professor Daniel Hemel asks whether we would prefer that wealthy
taxpayers rush into making donations before December 31 so that they can get a
current deduction, or whether we "prefer that they have time to consider where
their $$$ can be most useful[.]" Daniel Hemel (@DanielJHemel), TWITTER (Feb.
26,
2019,
11:06
AM),
https://twitter.com/DanielJHemel/status
/1100472248337645569?s=20
[https://perma.cc/N8FH-FAAE].
Allowing a
current deduction for donations to private foundations and donor-advised funds,
even if that delays public charities' receipt of the donations, may have some
benefits.
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There are very real differences between the two charitable vehicles.
The costs of establishing and running a donor-advised fund are far
lower for individual donors than the costs of establishing and running
a private foundation. 243 And while donors to a donor-advised fund
can advise the sponsoring organization on how to distribute their
donated money, donors have no legal authority to distribute the
money once it has been donated. 244
Despite those differences, donor-advised funds look more like
private foundations than like public charities. Their purpose is to
receive charitable donations and distribute those assets to operating
charities rather than to engage in charitable activities themselves.
Even if donors have no legal authority to direct their fund's
distributions, sponsoring organizations have a strong incentive to
follow the donor's recommendations. 245 Ultimately, shifting their
treatment into the private foundation regime-rather than creating
a brand new regime for a vehicle that shares the majority of its DNA
with private foundations-does not add more complexity to the tax
rules surrounding tax-exempt organizations. In other words, while
the private foundation rules are not a perfect match, they are a goodenough match. In the case of donor-advised funds, good enough is
better than perfect, because a good-enough solution does not add the
additional complexity that a tailored approach to donor-advised funds

would add.
A.

Miniature Private Foundations

While donor-advised funds share the same uses as private
foundations, they clearly qualify under current law as public
charities. 246 Each donor's donation is placed in its own segregated
account, and each sponsoring organization manages segregated
accounts from multiple donors. 2 4 7 However, the segregated accounts
are merely bookkeeping annotations, illusory as a legal matter.
Donors make their donations to the sponsoring organization 248 and,
because the sponsoring organization receives more than one-third of
its donations from the general public, it qualifies as a public
charity. 249

Simply adding a new subsection stating that, public support
notwithstanding, donor-advised funds will be treated as private
foundations is not a good solution. As with other proposals, that

243. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
248. See I.R. C. § 170(f)(18)(B) (2018) (requiring donors to donor-advised funds
to receive acknowledgment from the sponsoring organization that the sponsoring
organization has "exclusive legal control over the assets contributed").
249. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi).
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would create a new regime, putting pressure on the definition of a
donor-advised fund and adding complexity to the tax law. A better
solution would work within the confines of what already exists.
Instead of just declaring that the tax law will treat donor-advised
funds as private foundations, it should look at donor-advised funds at
the segregated account level rather than the sponsoring organization
level. If a donor-advised fund qualified at the segregated account
level as a public charity (because, for instance, it had broad public
support), that particular segregated account would continue to be
treated as a public charity. If it did not, it would be treated as a
private foundation.
Evaluating the status of donor-advised funds at the segregated
account level would provide several benefits. It would maintain the
two-tier structure that the current tax law already provides. Donors
and sponsoring organizations would not have to learn a new regime.
Instead, they-as well as the IRS and the courts-would be able to
draw from half a century's worth of precedent in structuring and
operating the funds.
Looking at donor-advised funds at the segregated account level
would also address the question of distributions. The tax law requires
private foundations to distribute 5 percent of their assets annually. 250
Whether the 5 percent distribution requirement is too low, 251 too
high, 2 52 or just right is beyond the scope of this discussion. What is
important, for the sake of simplicity and fairness, is that the
distribution requirement be consistent between donor-advised funds
and private foundations.
If policymakers determine that the
distribution requirement should increase to 10 percent or that all
assets should be distributed within five years of their contribution, it
can do that by changing the private foundation rules. Any donoradvised fund categorized as a private foundation would automatically
face the same distribution requirement.
Classifying donor-advised funds at the segregated account level
would also mean that the other restrictions on, and obligations of,
private foundations would apply to donor-advised funds that fail to
qualify as public charities. In fact, the general rules applicable to
private foundations would probably render the donor-advised fund
excise taxes superfluous and allow Congress to remove them.

250. See id. § 4942(d), (e)(1).
251. See Eric Franklin Amarante, The Perils of Philanthrocapitalism,78 MD.
L. REV. 1, 49 (2018) ("When considering all of the generous tax benefits enjoyed
by private foundations, one might reasonably conclude that the mandatory
distribution requirement is not commensurate with the potential forgone tax
revenue.").

252. See Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?,
64 TAx L. REV. 283, 286-87 (2011) ("I believe mandating a certain level of
distributions to be unwise since it is both disruptive and unlikely to succeed in
reducing accumulation.").
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Classifying donor-advised funds at the segregated account level
solves the problem of using donor-advised funds to circumvent the
public support and the private foundation distribution rules. 2 53
Donations from private foundations generally do not qualify as public
support for purposes of qualifying as a public charity. 254 And private
foundations cannot count distributions to other private foundations
in calculating their qualifying distributions. 255 Provided it is viable
to treat each segregated account separately, evaluating whether
donor-advised funds qualify as public charities on an account-byaccount basis will solve many of the problems that the current liminal
treatment of donor-advised funds raises.
B.

The Community Trust Rules

The question of whether to treat separate accounts individually
or collectively in determining public charity status is far from novel.
Community trusts faced this question decades ago, and the IRS
enacted regulations to determine whether to treat a community trust
as a unified tax-exempt organization (and thus probably a public
charity) or a series of atomized organizations (most likely private
foundations). 256
For a community trust to be treated as a single entity, it has to
meet several criteria. The fund must be created by a gift or other type
of gratuitous transfer and cannot be subject to material conditions or
restrictions. 257 The organization must "be commonly known as a
community trust, fund, foundation, or other similar name." 258 The
funds must all be governed by a common instrument, and the
organization must have a distribution committee or governing body
in common. 259 If the community trust meets all of these requirements
then, for tax purposes, it will be treated as a single entity in
determining whether it has sufficient public support to qualify as a
public charity. 2 60
This set of regulations feels odd: why would the default treatment
not be as a single entity? After all, single-entity treatment appears
to be the default and is why donors can use donor-advised funds to

253. Classifying donor-advised funds at the segregated account level would
also effectively address the question of using donor-advised funds to accelerate
charitable deductions without a concomitant benefit to society by subjecting them
to the same rules as private foundations.
254. See I.R.C. §170(b)(1)(A)(vi); see also St. John's Orphanage, Inc. v. United
States, 16 Cl. Ct. 299, 302 (1989) ("Only contributions which come directly from
the general public or from other publicly supported organizations qualify as
public support.").

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See I.R.C. § 4942(g)(1)(A).
See Colinvaux, supra note 99, at 18.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(ii) (as amended in 2011).
Id. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(iii).
Id. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(iv)-(v)(A).
Id. § 170A-9(f)(11)(i).
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circumvent the public support rules, as well as control and
distribution rules. It turns out that these regulations "were written
for community foundations as they existed in 1969," not for modern
donor-advised funds. 261 Under the community trust model the
regulations addressed, the community trust functioned as an
umbrella over individual trusts, each of which existed as an
independent entity and held title to its own assets. 262 Because the
donations were "often received and maintained in the form of
separate trusts or funds,"2 63 each trust and fund would have to qualify
separately as a public charity or face the limitations and regulation
of private foundations. 264 The regulations provide a subject-over-form
rule that allows community foundations that exercise sufficient
control over the putatively independent trusts and funds to be treated
as a single entity. 265
On the surface, these regulations appear to provide a path
forward for determining whether to treat donor-advised funds as a
single entity or as an agglomeration of separate entities. Despite that
surface-level similarity, ultimately the community trust regulations
are inapposite to the question of donor-advised funds.
The
regulations were enacted to address almost precisely the opposite
question from the one donor-advised funds raise. After all, the
separate accounts that make up donor-advised funds are merely
bookkeeping entries of a larger entity. Because of that, and absent
some kind of contractual agreement with donors, a donor-advised
fund will always meet the criteria in the community trust regulations.
Further, due to the structure of those accounts and the fact that the
sponsoring organization actually owns the donated property and can
exercise legal control over the property, the sponsoring organization
can also exercise legal control over those accounts.
While the
community trust regulations do not solve the question of how to treat
donor-advised funds, they suggest that some kind of subject-overform analysis would be appropriate in this context.
Ultimately, the community trust regulations provide support for
the idea of looking to substance rather than form when determining
the tax consequences that inure to donor-advised funds. But those
regulations do far less in providing an outline for what the tax law
should do to ensure that donor-advised funds make charitable
distributions or to prevent donors from using donor-advised funds to
circumvent the private foundation rules.
The reason these
regulations fail to do those things is because they were designed and
261.

George Johnson & David Jones, Community Foundations, in EXEMPT

ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994,
at

(CPE) TECHNICAL
pt.
2.C (1993),

https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick94.pdf [https://perma.cc/LTK6-EDSJ].
262. Colinvaux, supra note 99, at 18.
263. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9()(10).
264. Id.
265. Colinvaux, supra note 99, at 18.
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enacted as a taxpayer-favorable regime. Treating separate entities
as a single entity increases the likelihood that they will meet the
public support requirements and thus qualify as public charities.
Donor-advised funds present essentially the opposite situation
from the one the community trust regulations were meant to deal
with. Instead of several entities being treated as a single entity, a
current donor-advised fund is a single entity (with multiple accounts)
that largely functions as though each account is a separate entity.
The theory underlying the community trust regulations-that is,
looking to the substance, not the form, of the funds-applies here, but
it should play out differently. Instead of treating qualifying separate
entities as a single entity, it should look to whether a putatively single
entity should be treated as separate entities.
C.

Substance over Form with Donor-Advised Funds

Even if a subject-over-form rule is an appropriate way to address
donor-advised funds, the question of whether treating each account
separately is a viable solution-or whether that type of artificial
separation will be unadministrable and add unnecessary complexity
to the tax law-remains. The answer is, not only is such treatment
administrable, but the IRS already has experience treating single
entities as multiple entities for tax purposes. 266
In 1996, Delaware became the first state to allow series limited
liability companies ("LLCs").267 A series LLC can designate different
series within the entity that each hold separate assets or engage in

266. While administrable, treating each separate account as a separate entity
will increase the costs associated with donor-advised funds. Instead of the
sponsoring organization filing a single Form 990, each separate account would
have to file its own tax return. The IRS estimates that it requires 32.7 hours to
file a Form 990-PF and that it costs $932 to do so. Instructions for Form 990-PF
(2019), IRS, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990pf.pdf (last visited May 1, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/ZLP3-BL27]. For a donor-advised fund with only $5000, that
would be a crushing burden. The IRS could solve that problem, though. In 2007,
the IRS introduced Form 990-N, a simplified information return for small taxexempt organizations (excluding private foundations). Mathew Encino, Holy
Profits: How Federal Law Allows for the Abuse of the Church Tax-Exempt Status,
14 Hous. Bus. & TAx L.J. 78, 89 (2014). Tax-exempt organizations other than
private foundations with annual revenue of $50,000 or less and assets of $250,000
or less qualify to file the Form 990-N. Evelyn Brody & Marcus Owens, Exile to
Main Street: The I.R.S.'s Diminished Role in Overseeing Tax-Exempt
Organizations,91 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 859, 881 (2016). The IRS estimates that the
Form 990-N takes two hours to complete and costs $10. Instructions for Form
990-PF (2019), supra. Because private foundations tend to be larger to justify
their cost and administrative burden, see supra note 95 and accompanying text,
there has been no need for a similar simplified information return. To the extent
that smaller donor-advised funds would begin to qualify as private foundations,
though, it may make sense to provide a similar simplified information return for
smaller private foundations.
267. Michael E. Mooney, Series LLCs: The Loaves and Fishes of Subchapter
K, 116 TAx NOTES 663, 664 n.9 (2007).
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different businesses. 268 Each series has its own debts and liabilities,
and the debts and liabilities in one series are not enforceable against
the debts and liabilities of the LLC's other series. 2 69
In spite of having separate series, a series LLC is a single entity
for state law purposes, and thus each of the various series cannot
have different members. 270 Each series is associated with one or more
members, and income from a particular series is allocated and
distributed only to those members associated with that series. 2 7 1
Similarly, while all members are technically members of the series
LLC itself, only those members associated with a particular series can
have any management rights in that series. 272
How the tax law would approach series LLCs remained an open
question for almost a decade and a half.273 Would they be taxed as a
single entity despite the fact that they allocated and distributed their
income based on a member's association with a separate series? 274
Would each series be treated as a separate entity in spite of the fact
that the series were not individual entities? 275
In 2010, the Treasury released proposed regulations to answer
these questions. 276 Under the proposed regulations, the tax law
would treat each series of a domestic series LLC as a separate entity
for tax purposes. 277
Only the members associated with that
particular series would face tax consequences from that particular
series' income, loss, and other tax attributes.
A series LLC is clearly not identical to a donor-advised fund.
Series LLCs involve actual equity ownership with an associated
economic interest, something tax-exempt organizations cannot
have. 278 But in many ways, they are analogous. A series LLC is a
single entity that allocates certain assets to some, but not all, of its
members. 279 Likewise, a donor-advised fund associates particular

268. Id. at 664.
269. Id.
270. Series LLCs and Cell Companies, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,699, 55,699 (proposed
Sept. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301). "Members" of an LLC are the
equity owners of that LLC. Lila L. Inman, Note, PersonalEnough for Protection:
The Fifth Amendment and Single-Member LLCs, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1067,
1087 (2017) ("The LLC's equity interest owner ... is referred to as a 'member."').
271. Alberto R. Gonzales & J. Leigh Griffith, Challenges of Multi-State Series
and Framework for JudicialAnalysis, 42 J. CORP. L. 653, 656 (2017).
272. Id. at 657.
273. See Mooney, supra note 267, at 668.
274. Id. ("The LLC, despite its separate series, could be taxable as a single
entity for federal income tax purposes.").
275. Id. (" [E]ach series could be treated as a disregarded entity, the sole owner
of which is the LLC of which it is a part.").
276. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(5), 75 Fed. Reg. 55,699, 55,707-09
(Sept. 14, 2010).
277. Id. § 301.7701-1(a)(5)(i), 75 Fed. Reg. at 55,707.
278. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).
279. Gonzales & Griffith, supra note 271, at 656.
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charitable assets with particular donors. 280 While technically all of
the assets in all of the funds belong to the sponsoring organization,
donors have a certain amount of control over the assets in funds
associated with them.
It is not a significant stretch to treat each separate account as a
separate charitable entity for purposes of classifying the account as a
public charity or a private foundation. The classification of an entity
for federal tax purposes does not depend on that entity's treatment
under state or local law. 281
If the IRS treated each segregated account as a separate
charitable entity, the tax law would not require a third classification
for donor-advised funds and would not require an additional set of
rules. In most instances, it would look at who was donating to the
account under the standard rules that differentiate public charities
from private foundations. Essentially, that would implicate two
rules: the more-than-one-third rule and the not-more-than-one-third
rule.
The more-than-one-third rule requires that a tax-exempt
organization be treated as a private foundation unless more than onethird of its support comes from governmental units, public charities,
and "persons other than disqualified persons . . with respect to the
organization." 282 Disqualified persons include foundation managers,
substantial contributors, and certain individuals and entities related
to the foundation managers and substantial contributors. 283
The foundation manager limitation would be unlikely to do much
work with respect to donor-advised funds. The Code defines a
foundation manager as an "officer, director, or trustee of a foundation"
or an employee of the foundation with authority to act for the
foundation. 284 In a donor-advised fund, the equivalent of the
foundation manager would most likely be the sponsoring
organization, and the sponsoring organization would be unlikely to
make many, if any, donations to its funds. The donors generally have
the ability to advise the sponsoring organization on investments
strategies and where to send money, but they lack any authority to
make those things happen. 28 5 As a result, donor-advised funds are
likely to receive little, if any, money from disqualified foundation
managers.
The substantial contributor limitation, on the other hand, is
likely to ensnare a significant portion of donor-advised funds. The
Code defines a substantial contributor as anybody who contributes
more than $5000 to the foundation, as long as that $5000 is more than

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See Colinvaux, supra note 99, at 22.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2011).
I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 4946(a)(1).
Id. § 4946(b).
See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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2 percent of the contributions received by the foundation. 286
Moreover, "[o]nce a person is a substantial contributor with respect
to a private foundation, [s]he remains a substantial contributor." 2 87
As long as a donor-advised fund gets the bulk of its donations from a
single donor (or that donor and her spouse), 288 it will not qualify as a
public charity.
Even in years where the donors make no contributions, a donoradvised fund would find it difficult to qualify as a public charity.
Along with the public support requirement, a public charity cannot
receive more than one-third of its support in any given year from,
among other things, investment income (including interest,
dividends, rents, and royalties). 289 As a result, even in a year where
the donor makes no contributions (and thus there is no problem with
the substantial contributor limitation), most segregated accounts of a
donor-advised fund would not qualify as a public charity because
more than one-third of their income is likely to be investment income.
Treating segregated accounts of donor-advised funds as separate
entities does not mean that no donor-advised fund will ever qualify as
a public charity. If, for instance, fifty individuals got together to
donate to one segregated account, and they all consistently donated
the same amount every year, no individual would be a substantial
contributor, 290 and their donor-advised fund would meet the public
support test.
This would be a perfectly acceptable result. If a donor-advised
fund had fifty contributors, the fund would be accountable to those
fifty people. That broad public accountability was exactly what
Congress had in mind when it enacted the public support requirement
for public charities. 29 1 Congress believed that that level of public
accountability superseded the need for tighter regulation and excise
taxes that the private foundation regime imposed. 292
Keeping the two current classifications of tax-exempt
organizations avoids adding complexity to the tax system. It also
simplifies future reforms. Congress may decide to adopt one of the
reform proposals for donor-advised funds in the future. It is hard to
justify requiring a donor-advised fund-but not a private
foundation-to pay out all of its receipts within five years or to forbid
a donor to a donor-advised fund-but not a private foundation-from
taking a charitable deduction until the fund distributes the money to
286. I.R.C. §§ 507(d)(2)(A), 4946(a)(2).
287. Treas. Reg. § 1.507-6(b)(1) (1972).
288. I.R.C. § 507(d).
289. Id. § 509(a)(2)(B)(i), (e).
290. Nobody would be a substantial contributor because each donor would
provide exactly 2 percent of the donor-advised fund's aggregate receipts. Because
nobody donated more than 2 percent, nobody would meet the statutory definition
of a substantial contributor.
291. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
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an active charity. If Congress determines that one of these reformsor another type of reform-is valuable, it can simply change the
private foundation rules. Because the categorization of donor-advised
funds would occur individually for each segregated account, the new
rule would automatically take effect for those donor-advised funds
too.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The ability of donor-advised funds to effectively function as
private foundations, while technically qualifying as public charities,
makes them remarkably attractive to donors. They simultaneously
provide donors with the effective (if not the legal) control of a private
foundation and the deduction limitations, privacy, and lack of
distribution requirements of a public charity.
By fitting in the gap between public charities and private
foundations, donor-advised funds allow donors to circumvent rules
Congress has enacted to ensure that tax-deductible donations benefit
the public good. While there may be societal benefits to allowing
accelerated deductions for money that will go to charitable purposes
eventually, there are also downsides. For instance, a charity cannot
use money that it does not have, and the government also cannot use
revenue that it has foregone.
Perhaps just as important, the ability of the wealthy to take
charitable deductions without oversight and without actually
donating the money could erode the public's trust.293 That trust is
critical to the viability of the charitable sector. 294 By capturing donoradvised funds that act like private foundations and treating them as
private foundations for tax purposes, Congress and the IRS can
ensure that they exercise the appropriate level of oversight in
regulating donor-advised funds, helping to ensure both the
appropriate treatment of charitable donors and continued public
confidence in the charitable sector.

293. See, e.g., Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the
Charitable Sector Through a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 1, 7 (2009) ("The barrage of media reports on scandals and abuses
in the charitable sector, combined with the perception of lax regulation, has
eroded public confidence in the charitable sector.").
294. Id. at 7-8 ("Public confidence in the sector's integrity is essential to its
survival since it relies heavily on gratuitous contributions of cash, property, and
services.").

